District Wins: Nonpublic School Contract Termination Was Not an Expulsion

A parent challenged Miller Creek School District after Anova Center for Education terminated its contract for her fifth-grade son with autism. The parent argued the termination was effectively an expulsion triggered by the student's disability-related behavior, requiring a manifestation determination. The ALJ found the termination was a lawful contract cancellation, not a disciplinary action, and that the district promptly identified a replacement placement.

What Happened

The student was an eleven-year-old fifth grader with autism and speech-language impairment, placed by Miller Creek School District at Anova Center for Education, a certified nonpublic school. Beginning in 2020, the student received services virtually due to COVID-19. When Anova announced it would return to in-person learning in fall 2021, the parent did not enroll the student physically, citing her own health concerns. Anova continued providing virtual therapy and independent study in the interim, and at a December 2021 IEP meeting all parties agreed the student would transition back to in-person learning at Anova in February 2022.

Before that transition could happen, Anova notified Miller Creek on February 4, 2022, that it was terminating its contract with a required 20-day written notice. Anova's director explained that the student had not been making progress, had largely been attending virtually rather than in person, and — critically — that Anova's program was designed for younger children and could no longer meet the student's needs as he aged. The parent argued that Anova's decision was really driven by the student's behavioral outbursts (cussing, tantrums, and conflicts with staff during virtual sessions), which she said were caused by his autism, and that the termination should therefore be treated as an expulsion requiring a formal manifestation determination hearing under federal law.

What the ALJ Found

The ALJ ruled entirely in favor of Miller Creek and found the following:

The termination was a contract cancellation, not a disciplinary action. The Master Contract between Miller Creek and Anova expressly allowed either party to terminate the agreement on 20 days' written notice, consistent with California Education Code § 56366(a)(4). This is a standard contractual right, not a disciplinary removal.
Anova's stated reasons were not disciplinary. Anova's director testified that the primary reasons for termination were the student's failure to return to in-person learning as agreed and the fact that Anova's program was no longer appropriate for an older student — not because the student violated a code of conduct.
No manifestation determination was required. Federal law (20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)) only requires a manifestation determination when a district seeks to change a student's placement because the student violated a code of student conduct. Because this termination was not disciplinary, that legal trigger was never activated.
The district acted promptly to protect the student's placement. Within the 20-day notice period, Miller Creek identified a comparable certified nonpublic school — Irene M. Hunt School in San Anselmo — and communicated that offer to the parent before Anova's services even ended. The parent rejected the offer without expressing any inherent objection to the school itself, and the student's loss of services was therefore not caused by the district's actions.

What Was Ordered

The parent's expedited due process claims were denied in full.
Miller Creek School District was found to have not violated 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k).
No compensatory education, placement changes, or other relief was ordered.

Why This Matters for Parents

A nonpublic school ending its contract is not automatically an expulsion. California law allows school districts and nonpublic schools to terminate placement contracts on 20 days' notice. If the stated reason is the school's inability to serve the student's needs — not disciplinary misconduct — a manifestation determination is not legally required. As a parent, understand the difference between a contract termination and a disciplinary removal.
Document that behavior is disability-related, but also challenge the stated reason. In this case, there was email evidence showing the student's outbursts had been flagged. However, the ALJ credited Anova's director's testimony that aging-out and virtual attendance — not behavior — drove the decision. If you believe a termination is truly behavior-based, you will need strong evidence to counter the school's stated rationale.
Rejecting a district's replacement offer can hurt your case. The district's prompt offer of another nonpublic school was a key reason it prevailed. The parent rejected the Hunt School without a clear substantive objection, and the ALJ found that any service gap was the parent's choice, not the district's failure. If you disagree with a proposed replacement placement, attend the IEP meeting, document your specific objections in writing, and file a complaint — but do not simply refuse without engaging the process.
Request an IEP meeting immediately when a nonpublic school ends its contract. Even though no manifestation determination was required here, the district did convene an IEP meeting to discuss the change. Parents have the right to meaningfully participate in that process. Use it to advocate for a replacement placement that truly meets your child's needs rather than allowing the district to make that decision alone.
Expedited hearings have very high bars. The expedited due process process under § 1415(k) is specifically designed for disciplinary disputes. If your child's removal does not clearly arise from a code-of-conduct violation, this legal avenue may not be the right tool. Consult a special education attorney before filing an expedited complaint to make sure you are using the correct legal mechanism for your situation.

What Happened

What the ALJ Found

The ALJ ruled entirely in favor of Miller Creek and found the following:

The termination was a contract cancellation, not a disciplinary action. The Master Contract between Miller Creek and Anova expressly allowed either party to terminate the agreement on 20 days' written notice, consistent with California Education Code § 56366(a)(4). This is a standard contractual right, not a disciplinary removal.
Anova's stated reasons were not disciplinary. Anova's director testified that the primary reasons for termination were the student's failure to return to in-person learning as agreed and the fact that Anova's program was no longer appropriate for an older student — not because the student violated a code of conduct.
No manifestation determination was required. Federal law (20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)) only requires a manifestation determination when a district seeks to change a student's placement because the student violated a code of student conduct. Because this termination was not disciplinary, that legal trigger was never activated.
The district acted promptly to protect the student's placement. Within the 20-day notice period, Miller Creek identified a comparable certified nonpublic school — Irene M. Hunt School in San Anselmo — and communicated that offer to the parent before Anova's services even ended. The parent rejected the offer without expressing any inherent objection to the school itself, and the student's loss of services was therefore not caused by the district's actions.

What Was Ordered

The parent's expedited due process claims were denied in full.
Miller Creek School District was found to have not violated 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k).
No compensatory education, placement changes, or other relief was ordered.

Why This Matters for Parents

A nonpublic school ending its contract is not automatically an expulsion. California law allows school districts and nonpublic schools to terminate placement contracts on 20 days' notice. If the stated reason is the school's inability to serve the student's needs — not disciplinary misconduct — a manifestation determination is not legally required. As a parent, understand the difference between a contract termination and a disciplinary removal.
Document that behavior is disability-related, but also challenge the stated reason. In this case, there was email evidence showing the student's outbursts had been flagged. However, the ALJ credited Anova's director's testimony that aging-out and virtual attendance — not behavior — drove the decision. If you believe a termination is truly behavior-based, you will need strong evidence to counter the school's stated rationale.
Rejecting a district's replacement offer can hurt your case. The district's prompt offer of another nonpublic school was a key reason it prevailed. The parent rejected the Hunt School without a clear substantive objection, and the ALJ found that any service gap was the parent's choice, not the district's failure. If you disagree with a proposed replacement placement, attend the IEP meeting, document your specific objections in writing, and file a complaint — but do not simply refuse without engaging the process.
Request an IEP meeting immediately when a nonpublic school ends its contract. Even though no manifestation determination was required here, the district did convene an IEP meeting to discuss the change. Parents have the right to meaningfully participate in that process. Use it to advocate for a replacement placement that truly meets your child's needs rather than allowing the district to make that decision alone.
Expedited hearings have very high bars. The expedited due process process under § 1415(k) is specifically designed for disciplinary disputes. If your child's removal does not clearly arise from a code-of-conduct violation, this legal avenue may not be the right tool. Consult a special education attorney before filing an expedited complaint to make sure you are using the correct legal mechanism for your situation.